As the participants in this collaborative exercise who are mathematics education researchers espouse a cognitive perspective, it is not surprising that there were few genuine disagreements between them and the psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists during the process of generating a consensual research agenda. In contrast, the prototypical mathematics education researcher will mostly likely find the resulting list of priority open questions to be overly restrictive in its scope of topics to be studied, highly biased toward quantitative methods, and extremely narrow in its disciplinary perspectives. It is argued here that the fundamental disconnects between the epistemological foundations, theoretical perspectives, and methodological predilections of cognitive psychologists and mainstream mathematics education researchers preclude the prospect of future productive collaborative efforts between these fields. The authors of the Challenges article are to be commended for the time, energy, and thoughtfulness they obviously put into generating a collaboratively-derived, consensual research agenda in the form of a list of research questions framed as major challenges for the field of mathematical cognition. At the beginning of their background section, the authors fittingly describe some of the differences between researchers in mathematics education, psychology, and cognitive neuroscience in terms of their training, central questions and interests, research methods, venues for presenting their findings, and publication outlets. Furthermore, the authors rightly point out that "there has traditionally been little communication between researchers working in these areas; cross-citations (with education in particular) are comparatively rare." And as they also correctly acknowledge, the type of exercise they carried out "is naturally limited by the experience and knowledge of its participants, and must trade off breadth of representation against depth of focus."
being able to collaboratively hammer out a research agenda with only a limited number of authentic disputes, the disadvantage is that the prototypical mathematics education researcher will probably find this list of "priority research questions" to be: a. extremely narrow in its scope by failing to include situated, contextual, or ethnomathematical considerations, not to mention democratic access to important mathematical ideas or equity-based mathematics teaching; b. notably restrictive in its implicit (and in one case explicit-Question 21) methodological bias toward quantitative, experimental methods, and c. conspicuously limited to a cognitive psychological perspective to the exclusion of anthropological, sociological, linguistic, semiotic, historical, and political viewpoints.
Shifting perspectives in mathematics education research that took place during the late 20th century began to diverge from developments and advances in the cognitive psychology of mathematical thinking and learning.
These changes have since led to genuine disconnects between not only what contemporary mathematics education researchers and cognitive psychologists study with respect to mathematics learning and instruction, but also how and why. As De Smedt and Verschaffel (2010) point out, " . . . a major challenge to mathematics education in establishing itself as a scientific discipline was in freeing itself from the dominance of general cognitive psychology [emphasis added] and developing its own theoretical models and research methods (De Corte, Greer, & Verschaffel, 1996) " (p. 653).
A Developmental Disconnection Syndrome
In the field of neuropsychology, a "developmental disconnection syndrome" (Geschwind & Levitt, 2007) refers to a constellation of signs and symptoms resulting from an abnormal development of brain connectivity that is critical for communication between specialized cortical regions. In my view, this kind of neurodevelopmental disorder can serve as a useful analogy to characterize the historical changes that have led to a lack of communication between mainstream mathematics education research and cognitive psychology, including the resultant systemic and increasingly pervasive differences between them. Specifically, I believe that despite some notable exceptions, the divide between these fields has never been greater, as manifested in pronounced dissimilarities if not outright conflicts between their respective spheres of interest, preferred research methods, levels of analysis, considerations of developmental change, attention to individual differences, types of empirical effects, theoretical conceptions, and epistemological stances. Table 1 provides numerous examples of these kinds of contrasts, where I have also illustrated how sometimes the same term is used in markedly different ways by cognitive psychologists and disciplines. In the case of the former, engineers draw on fundamental laws of physics, chemistry, and mathematics for designing, developing, testing, and manufacturing products and services used in everyday life (Moaveni, 2011) .
Should educators be applying basic principles of cognitive science to their profession-that is, to the design, development, testing, and production of academic standards, instructional practices, assessment strategies, and curricula? Klahr, Zimmerman, and Jirout (2011) claim that this characterization is precisely how things should operate. Specifically, they liken educational interventions to engineering artifacts, where "Instructional design and curriculum development can be viewed as the engineering application of the basic science of cognition: Based on the best available science, one crafts a complex artifact, ranging from a problem set to a lesson plan to an entire curriculum, and then measures performance in non-idealized circumstances (real classrooms with real teachers and students)" (p. 973).
In contrast to this account, the vast majority of present-day mathematics education studies and instructional practices do not appear to draw on the latest and best available empirical findings emanating from the basic science of cognition. This state of affairs is not entirely surprising, as mainstream mathematics education researchers consider laboratory-based, experimental quantitative studies of mathematical cognition (as well as learning and instruction) to be of only limited value to educational policymakers, administrators, and practitioners (Boaler, 2008) .
Furthermore, the objectivist/mechanistic/positivist epistemology that purportedly undergirds experimental cognitive psychology is viewed as inconsistent with if not antithetical to the constructivist epistemology that Thompson (2014) asserts is "taken for granted" by contemporary mathematics education researchers-a position that was foreshadowed by Geary (1995) 
Conclusions
The participants/authors of the Challenges article have clearly demonstrated that cognitive psychologists, neuroscientists, and mathematics education researchers whose own research focuses on mathematical cognition can resolve whatever differences they have to effectively produce a research agenda that is likely to have considerable heuristic value. Nevertheless, the fundamental disconnects between the epistemological foundations, theoretical perspectives, and methodological predilections of cognitive psychologists and mainstream mathematics education researchers (i.e., those who do not espouse a cognitive perspective) preclude the likelihood that consequential collaborative efforts between these fields will ensue. Likewise, these differences will no doubt continue to seriously limit the application of promising advances in the basic science of mathematical cognition to mathematics education research.
In contrast to this rather pessimistic prognosis, it may prove more viable to try to increase mathematics educators' knowledge of basic cognitive processing as it applies directly to pedagogy. Indeed, encouraging steps have already
